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Influence of Postevent Information in the Recall of 
Central and Peripheral Details of an Eyewitnessed 
Event 
Kathi Kaehler, Yvonne Larson, and Gloria Marmolejo 
Winona State University 
Previous research has shown that misleading postevent information can alter the report of a previously 
witnessed event. The present experiment extends on this research by investigating whether central and peripheral 
details are affected differentially by misleading postevent information. Sixty-four undergraduate students were 
shown a series of slides depicting a theft from a convenience store. They were then exposed to a taped narrative 
which contained some misinformation and some neutral information about two central and two peripheral 
critical details. Finally, the subjects ' memory for the original event was tested using recognition and source 
questions. The accuracy data replicated the misinformation effect p<.05. Central and peripheral details of the 
original event were not affected differentially by the misinformation. The response latency results supported 
Loftus 's substitution theory. 
The Influence of Misleading Postevent 
Information in the Recall of Central and Peripheral 
Details of an Eyewitnessed Event. 
Numerous studies have repeatedly demonstrated 
that new information presented after witnessing an 
event can cause changes in the ability to report that 
event. When this new information is misleading, it 
can cause errors in the accuracy of the eyewitnesses 
report. 	 This phenomenon is known as the 
misinformation effect. 
Most of the research on the accuracy of 
eyewitness testimony involves a three-stage 
procedure (e.g., Belli, 1989: Lindsay, 1990; Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Donders, Hoffman & 
Schooler, 1989; Loftus, Weingardt & Lindsay, 1995; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Tverskv & Tuchin, 
1989). First, subjects witness a visual event. Next, 
they receive verbal or written information that 
includes either neutral or misleading information 
about particular details of the original event. 
Typically, subjects who are misinformed about a 
detail report things that did not occur in the original 
event (e.g., if the subjects see a Pepsi in the 
witnessed event and then they hear 7-Up in the 
postevent, the subjects may be more apt to report 
that the 7-Up was in the original event). Although 
there is little doubt that the misinformation effect can  
be obtained, the interpretation of why it occurs has 
gained less consensus. 
Several theories have been proposed to account 
for the misinformation effect. For example, Loftus 
(e.g., Loftus et al.1989; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; 
Loftus 	 et 	 al.1995) 	 proposed 	 the 
Substitution/Integration hypothesis which states that 
when we receive misleading information about a 
previously stored memory, we substitute and 
integrate the new information with the old, thus 
preventing access to the original information. 
Although there has been a lack of distinction 
between the integration (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989a; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b) and the 
substitution mechanisms (Belli, 1989) in the 
literature, it is important to differentiate between the 
two because they provide different explanations for 
the misinformation effect. The integration theory 
suggests that both memories for the original 
information and the misleading postevent 
information "integrate" thus resulting in a 
conjunction or blend of both memories. However, 
the substitution hypothesis predicts that the 
misleading postevent information overwrites the 
memory for the original event which thus prevents 
access to the original information. 
In contrast, according to the accessibility 
hypothesis (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983), when new 
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information Is presented the misleading postevent 
information does not alter the' previously formed 
memory; rather, the two memories coexist separately 
with the most recent information (misleading 
postevent) being the most accessible. Lindsay & 
Johnson (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay,1993;Linnsay,1990; Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989) proposed a source-misattribution hypothesis 
which states that the memories for both the original 
and misleading postevent information also coexist, 
but that subjects confuse the source of each memory. 
Response bias can also influence the way a subject 
responds (Christiansen & Ochalek, 1983). If the 
subject assumes that the experimenter obviously 
knows the content of the story, the subject many not 
question the accuracy of the postevent information 
and therefore, feel a pressure to report it regardless 
of his/her memory for the original event. 
What none of these explanations addresses is 
whether misleading information affects all the details 
of the original scene to the same degeee. It is not 
clear whether someone can be misled not only about 
details of secondary importance, but even on the 
most critical details. Investigators working in the 
area of reading comprehension have found 
differences in the memorability of different aspects 
of discourse. Readers' free-recall generally includes 
the primary or more important details rather than the 
secondary details. This difference between primary 
and secondary details increases with the retention 
interval between text reading and the recall test and 
with the numbers of reproduction intents 
(e.g.,Bartlett, 1932; Hunt & Love, 1972). Similarly, 
it may be possible that when people witness an 
event, the peripheral (secondary) details are 
forgotten, thus allowing the misinformation to take 
their place in memory. Because subjects' memory 
about the event might be formed predominantly by 
central (primary) details of the scene, central 
features may be less affected by postevent 
misinformation. This would imply that the reports of 
details pertaining to the perpetrators of the crimes 
may not be so accurate. Past research in eyewitness 
testimony has shown one kind of dissociation; 
arousal affects the recall of central and peripheral 
details differentially (e.g., Christiansen & Loftus, 
1987; Clifford & Scott, 1978; Deffenbacher,1983; 
Leippe, Wells & Ostrom, 1978). For example, 
Christiansen & Loftus (1987) have found that the 
theme of a traumatic event (central detail) is 
remembered better than perpheral details. 
Therefore, there is a reason to suspect that 
misinformation also influences differentially the 
details that have various degrees of relevance in the 
original scene. This possibility would certainly 
make the consequences of the misinformation effect 
less aggravating in the court. 
The purpose of the present experiment was 
threefold: a) to investigate whether subjects' 
memory for an eyewitnessed event is better for the 
central (more important) details than for the 
peripheral details, b) to find out whether misleading 
postevent information affects central and peripheral 
details differentially, and finally, c) to test between 
the integration and substitution hypotheses and 
contrast our results against the accessibility, source 
monitoring, and bias hypotheses. 
In order to investigate these questions, the 
present experiment had subjects view a target event 
and then listen to a taped narrative with postevent 
information which was either neutral or misleading 
about critical details. Lastly, the subjects were given 
a memory test which consisted first of a recognition 
yes/no question about a particular scene in the event 
followed by a confidence rating for their answer. 
Next, they were instructed to indicate the source 
from where they remembered perceiving the item or 
event, followed by a confidence rating for this source 
answer. Then central and peripheral details in both 
the slide and narrative combinations included these 
four critical items: jacket, money, soda, box. 
Because the thief and the items that he handled 
formed the mail theme of the story, they were always 
the central features. A maintenance man and the 
items that he handled were always the peripheral 
features. For example, a subject may have seen the 
thief wearing a blue jacket stealing four twenty 
dollar bills (cental details) while the maintenance 
man may have been reaching for tools from a small 
toolbox and then stopping momentarily to drink a 
Pepsi (peripheral details). 	 The opposite 
manipulation of this may have shown the thief 
stealing a Pepsi using a small box to hide it (central 
details) while the maintenance man was counting 
four twenty dollar bills from his pants pocket and 
wearing a blue jacket (peripheral details). 
In order to differentiate between the integration 
vs substitution hypotheses, besides including the 
original and the misleading event as response 
options, subjects were also given a blend or 
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conjunction option and a totally novel option on the 
memory test for the yes/no questions. For example, 
if the original slide showed that the thief was 
wearing a blue jacket and the misleading postevent 
narrative reported that the thief was wearing a red 
jacket, the memory test asked subjects to indicate 
whether or not the thief was wearing: (a) a blue 
jacket (original option), (b) a red jacket (misleading 
option), (c) a purple jacket (conjunction option), and 
(d) a yellow jacket (novel option). Because the 
integration hypotheses predict that the memory for 
both the original and misleading memory would be 
combined thus resulting in a new integrated memory, 
subjects that are misled about an item would be 
predicted to choose this option (purple jacket) 
significantly more than those subjects that receive 
neutral information. Also, subjects would choose 
the conjunction item more often than the totally new 
item (yellow jacket). In contrast, because the 
substitution hypothesis predicts that there would be 
an "overwriting" of the original memory, the 
conjunction option would not be selected. Instead, 
the misleading postevent information would be 
chosen (the red jacket). Also, subjects would be 
expected to choose the substitution item more often 
than the novel item (yellow jacket). 
To reduce the likelihood of response bias, 
subjects were warned that the information they heard 
in the taped narrative may or may not have been an 
accurate description of the slides. This was to 
discourage subjects from choosing the postevent 
option only because they assumed that the 
experimenter's account expressed in the narrative 
should be correct, regardless of their own memories. 
By measuring response latencies and confidence 
levels besides accuracy, the present experiment 
compared and contrasted different predictions from 
each of the other four hypotheses. First of all, it was 
hypothesized (a) that central details would be 
recalled better than peripheral details for both the 
recognition and the source questions, (b) that central 
details would be responded to faster than peripheral 
details when measuring both recognition and source 
reaction times. Finally it was hypothesized that (c) 
subjects would be more confident about the central 
than about the peripheral details of the eyewitnessed 
event. The substitution, integration, accessibility, 
and source hypotheses all predicted that subjects 
should be less accurate when identifying critical 
items in the misleading condition compared to the 
control neutral condition. 
In addition, both the substitution and the 
integration hypotheses would expect subjects to be 
equally fast and equally confident in both conditions, 
because in both cases, there would be only one 
memory. In contrast, according to the accessibility 
hypothesis, subjects would respond faster to the 
yes/no questions in the misleading condition than in 
the neutral condition, because the misleading 
postevent information, being the most recent, would 
be more accessible. According to the source-
misattribution hypothesis, subjects in the misleading 
condition would be more accurate in the source 
questions than in the yes/no recognition questions 
because the original memory would still be 
accessible after being misled when forced to focus 
their attention on the source of each event. 
However, subjects' responses would be slower in 
the misleading condition in both the yes/no and the 
source questions, because they would have to still 
differentiate where each memory comes from at the 
time of reading the question. Finally, according to 
the response bias hypothesis, the misleading 
condition should be equal to the neutral condition in 
all responses. This is because we controlled for bias 
by explicitly warning subjects about the possible 
inaccuracy of the tapes narrative. 
Method 
Subjects 
Sixty-four undergraduate students from two 
Midwest colleges participated in this experiment to 
earn extra credit for their psychology courses. The 
subjects consisted of 45 females and 19 males with 
an average age of 28 years old, who had a variety of 
majors. All were native English-speakers and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, as indicated 
by a Snellen test applied at the beginning of the 
experimental session. 
Materials and Design 
The original event consisted of a sequence of 41 
color slides which depicted the following burglary 
witnessed by a customer. A man entered a 
convenience store. While shopping, he wandered 
through the store, picked up a few items and 
eventually stole either a soda or some dollar bills. 
All the while a handyman was doing some 
maintenance work. There were four versions of the 
slides in which all but four slides were the same. 
The four critical slides that changed, displayed one 
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of two possible options: (a) soft drink (Pepsi or 7-
Up), (b) dollar bills (four $20 bills or eight $20 
bills), (c) jacket color (red or blue), and (d) box size 
(large cc small). One fourth of the subjects saw each 
version of each critical item. 
The postevent consisted of a professionally 
taped narrative containing approximately 426 words. 
It accurately described the details of the event except 
for the critical items. For a given subject, the 
narrative mentioned two critical items in a 
misleading way and two in a neutral way. There 
were 16 combinations of slide versions (1 to 4) and 
postevent information (neutral or misinformation). 
Four subjects were randomly assigned to each of the 
16 slide-narrative combinations. Each critical item 
appeared equally often as either a central or 
peripheral detail. As an example, half of the 
subjects saw the thief wearing the blue jacket 
(central detail), whereas the other half saw the 
maintenance man wearing the blue jacket (peripheral 
detail). Each version of each of the critical items was 
included in the control condition for half of the 
subjects and in the misleading condition for the other 
half. For example, from subjects who saw a blue 
jacket on the thief in the slides, half received a 
narrative referring to it as a red jacket (misleading 
condition). Furthermore, for each version of each 
critical item, the alternative version was used equally 
often as misleading information. Except for the 
necessary modifications with the critical items, the 
narrative was the same for all subjects. 
The subjects' memory was tested using a 55SX 
IBM compatible computer attached to a color 
monitor with a VGA adapter. The test was 
programmed using a Schneider's (1990) Micro 
Experimental Laboratory Program (MEL) software 
package version 1.0. The subjects were presented 
with explicit instructions about the test on the 
screen. At that point, they were also warned that 
some of the information that they had previously 
heard in the narrative may or may not have been an 
accurate description of the actual event. There were 
four types of questions asked for each of the four 
critical items and for each of the 21 noncritical 
items. They consisted of a yes/no recognition 
question, a source question, and two confidence 
ratings (one for the yes/no recognition question and 
one for the source question), therefore yielding a 
total of 100 questions. 
The experiment utilized a 2x2 within subjects 
design. The independent variables were the type of 
postevent narrative with misleading or neutral as the 
two levels, and item relevance with the two levels 
being central or peripheral. Therefore, there were 
four experimental conditions, with two different 
critical items in each. The dependent measures were 
accuracy, reaction time, and response confidence for 
the recognition and source questions. 
Procedure 
The subjects were told that the experiment was 
concerned about the effectiveness of visual, verbal, 
and numerical modes of presentation. 	 The 
experiment consisted of five parts with instructions 
presented before each stage. The slides were 
presented at a rate of 5 seconds per slide. 
Immediately after viewing the slides, the subjects 
were engaged in an unrelated 5 to 7-min math filler 
activity. 	 Specifically, they were required to 
complete several multiplication and division 
problems to keep them from rehearsing what they 
saw in the slide sequence. They then listened to a 2-
min taped narrative describing the event they 
witnessed in the slides. After another 5 to 7-min 
math filler activity to prevent rehearsal of what was 
heard in the narrative, the subjects began the test 
phase of the experiment. 
The test consisted of four types of questions 
about each of the 25 items. Therefore, there were 
100 questions, 16 of which were about critical items 
and 84 that were about noncritical items. The 
subjects were instructed to answer each question as 
quickly and as accurately as possible. The word 
"Ready" preceded each set of questions so that the 
subjects would know where to fixate their gaze. The 
subjects were then first given a yes/no recognition 
question, regarding the items that were presented to 
them in the slides. The task of the subjects was to 
press the blue key on the keyboard for a "yes" 
response or the red key for a "no" response (e.g., 
Was the thief wearing a blue jacket?). The YES and 
NO keys were designated by sticking a colored label 
on the / and z keys on the bottom row of the 
keyboard. The subjects were also given a question 
about the source where they remembered perceiving 
the item they were to respond by pressing the 
numerical keys (1=slide, 2=narrative, 3=both, 
4=neither) at the right side of the keyboard (e.g., 
Where do you remember perceiving the item or 
event from?). After each of these questions, the 
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subject entered his/her confidence about the selected 
answer on a 5-point rating scale, where 1=absolutely 
confident and 5=absolutely unsure. The response 
latency and the accuracy of the responses were 
registered by the computer for each trial. The 
students were required to complete a series of six 
practice trials to ensure that they understood the 
available options and were correctly answering the 
questions. Each experimental session lasted 
approximately 70 minutes. 
Results 
The data obtained in the yes/no recognition and 
the source questions were analyzed separately, 
pooled over three of the four critical items. The 
"box" item was excluded due to subjects' report 
about the subjectiveness of its size (small vs large). 
Yes/No recognition test. Figure la shows the 
accuracy data on the yes/no recognition memory test. 
As can be observed, subjects were significantly less 
accurate when identifying the critical items in the 
misleading condition (M=.665) than in the control 
condition (M=.805), F(1,63) = 40.42, p-0.000. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, the misinformation effect 
was replicated. However, the central items were not 
recalled significantly better than the peripheral 
items, F(1,63) = 0.67, p>.05. The interaction 
between narrative and relevance was not significant 
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Figure 1 - Mean response accuracy as a function of neutral 
and misleading postevent information regarding central and 
peripheral details (a) in the yes/no recognition questions, and 
(b) in the source questions. 
either, F(1,63) = 0.01, p>.05. 
6 
Figure 2a shows the reaction time data for the 
yes/no questions The results showed that subjects 
responded equally fast in both the misleading 
(M=3.70s) and control (M=3.417s) conditions, 
neutral 	 misinto 
Postevent 
	 Pent len& 
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Figure 2 - Mean reaction time as a function of neutral and 
misleading postevent information regarding central and 
periperal details (a) for the yes/no recognition questions, and 
(b) for the source questions. Time is measured in seconds. 
F(1,63) = 1.06, p>.05. Thus, we have no evidence 
to support neither the accessibility nor the source 
misattribution hypotheses. These hypotheses imply 
that misinformation produces a conflict that must be 
resolved during recall on the memory test, thus 
resulting in longer reaction times for the misleading 
condition. 
In order to test the integration vs. substitution 
hypothesis, the postevent ( neutral) information and 
the four response options (original, misleading, 
conjunction, new) were submitted to a 2x4 within 
subjects ANOVA. The results indicated a main 
effect of postevent, F(3,189)=16.32, a main effect of 
response option, F(3,189)=104.80, and a postevent 
by response option interaction, F(3,189)=29.73, 
p--0.000. More specifically, the number of times that 
people selected the misleading option in the 
- 
3 
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misleading condition (M=.69) was significantly 
greater than in the control condition (M=.09), 
F(1,63)=.69, p=.05. Misled subjects selected the 
misinformation option (M=.69) as often as the 
original event option (M=.61) and both significantly 
more often than the conjunction option (M=.14), 
F(1,63)=55.16, p=0.000, while never selecting the 
totally novel option (M=.00). Therefore, as can be 
sl eadi ng 
nettrel 
Figure 3 - Probability of a "yes" response for each of the four 
response options as affected by neutral and misleading 
postevent information. 
observed in Figure 3, these results tend to support 
the substitution hypothesis over the integration 
hypothesis. 	 Regarding response latency as a 
function of item relevance, there was a significant 
relevance by postevent interaction, F(1,63)=3.88, 
p=.05. In the misled condition, subjects responded 
significantly slower to peripheral details (M=4.29s) 
than in the control condition (M=3.45s). However, 
for the central details, subjects responded equally 
fast in both the misleading (M=3.11s) and the 
control (M=3.38s) conditions, F(1,63)=3.88, p=.05. 
Finally, the statistical analysis of the confidence 
ratings for the yes/no recognition test indicated that 
subjects were significantly more confident in their 
responses in the misleading condition (M=1,30) than 
in the control condition (M=1.50), F(1,63)=7.40, 
p=.008. Likewise, subjects who responded 
incorrectly were more confident about the peripheral 
details (M=1.64) than about the central details 
(M2.19), F(1.63)=40.39, p0.000. This pattern of 
results is hard to explain by any of the theories on 
the misinformation effect. 
Source test. Figure lb shows that subjects were 
significantly less accurate in the source memory test 
regarding misleading items (M=.437) than neutral 
items 	 =.518), F(1,63)=8.26, p<.01. However, as 
Figure 2b indicates, subjects responded equally fast 
in the misleading condition (M=3.012s) and the 
control condition (M=3.00s), F(1,63)=.012, p>.05. 
These results do not support the source 
misattribution theory, which would claim that misled 
subjects would have a longer reaction time in the 
misleading condition, because they have to spend 
time differentiating the source of each memory. 
Furthermore, misled subjects' accuracy in the source 
test was significantly lower (M 0.48) than in the 
yes/no recognition test 	 CI.79), F(1,63)=5.5, 
p<.05. This result does not support the source 
misattribution hypothesis either. According to this 
explanation, there is a memory trace for the original 
and one for the postevent information. The 
misleading effect results from a confusion in the 
source of each memory. However, if the witness' 
attention is directed toward the source at the time of 
retrieval, they can accurately recover the original 
memory. This would result in higher accuracy for the 
source than for the yes/no recognition test, which is 
opposite to our findings. 
Finally, the analysis on source test confidence 
revealed that subjects were equally confident in both 
the misleading condition=1.81) and the control 
condition (M=1.50), F(1,63)=1.03, p>.05. 
However, by separately analyzing the correct 
responses, subjects were significantly less confident 
in the misleading condition (M=2.75) than in the 
control condition (M=1.58) ,F(1,63)=4.77, p= 03. 
For the incorrect responses, subjects in the control 
condition were significantly more confident about 
peripheral details (M=1.40) than about the central 
details (M=1.64); whereas, in the misleading 
condition, the relevance of the details did not 
influence the confidence ratings, F(1,63)=4.90, 
p=.03. 
Two final one-way ANOVAs were computed to 
check the equivalence in memorability of the four 
slide sequences and the sixteen taped narratives. 
Subjects accuracy did not significantly differ across 
the particular slide sequence that the observers 
watched and the narrative that they heard, p>.05, 
except for one slide sequence. 
Discussion 
In summary, this research yielded three 
important findings. First, consistent with past 
research, the misinformation effect was replicated 
since subjects were much less accurate on the 
recognition questions when they were misled than 
when they were not_ Second, our research seemed to 
indicate that central and peripheral details of an 
eyewitnessed event were either recalled differentially 
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or affected by misinformation in a different manner. 
One possible explanation for the obtained results is 
that in fact, eyewitnesses recalled all details with 
equal accuracy. An alternative explanation is that 
misinformation affected different items differentially. 
That is, for some items, being a central part of the 
story made them less susceptible to misinformation 
than being peripheral. However, other items showed 
the opposite pattern, and thus canceled each other 
out in the averages. Another possibility may have 
been the differences in the quality of the slides that 
the subjects viewed. Some slides were lighter than 
others and this may have influenced what the 
subjects remembered seeing. This was especially 
evident after further analysis indicated that subjects' 
accuracy across the particular slide sequences that 
they watched differed significantly, which resulted in 
poorer accuracy of one of the four slide sequences. 
Future research would need to control for this by 
duplicating slides with the exact amount of lighting 
in each. 
Third, out of all the proposed theories to explain 
the misinformation effect, the substitution hypothesis 
gain the most support. First of all, the bias 
hypothesis (e.g., Christiansen & Ochalek, 1983) was 
not supported because subjects were not equally 
accurate even though bias was eliminated or at least 
greatly reduced in our experiment. The integration 
hypothesis (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; 1989b) 
was not supported either because subjects did not 
choose the conjunction option significantly more 
often in the misinformation condition than in the 
control condition. Likewise, no evidence was found 
for the accessibility hypothesis (e.g., Bekerian & 
Bowers, 1983) since subjects responded to the item 
questions equally fast in both the misleading and 
control conditions. Subjects were not faster at 
reporting the postevent because of being more recent 
and accessible. 
The results did not support the source 
misattribution hypothesis either (e.g.,Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 
1993; Lindsay, 1990), since subjects responded 
equally fast to the source test in the misleading and 
the control condition, and also because subjects in 
the misleading condition were much less rather than 
more accurate on the source test in comparison to 
the recognition test. In contrast, the substitution 
theory (e.g.,Belli, 1989) was upheld because 
subjects responded equally fast to the item yes/no  
questions. This suggests that subjects only had one 
memory at the time of the test. In addition, subjects 
in the misleading condition reported witnessing the 
misleading items significantly more often than the 
original, conjunction, and new response options. 
However, future research is needed to address a 
problem with the source questions. It appeared that 
when subjects responded to these questions, they did 
not use all of their options and maybe misunderstood 
their meanings despite a thorough explanation. It 
would be interesting to see if the same effect could 
be obtained using different wording to ask the source 
questions. 
Taken together, this research implies that a 
witness to a crime can actually be influenced by 
misleading postevent information. The reason for 
this influence, as found in our research, seems to he 
that once people are confronted with conflicting 
information, they are no longer able to access what 
was originally witnessed even when made to focus 
on the source of both the original and postevent 
information. This may therefore lead to a report 
which may contain false information. These findings 
may be considered devastating, especially 
considering the fact that someone can be convicted 
based solely on eyewitnesses testimony. 
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